This study investigates how the spillover effect of retail service investment affects timing preference of quantity decision in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric demand information. The manufacturer-quantity-leader game and retailer-quantity-leader game are considered. Applying a signaling game-theoretic approach, we show that, for the chain members, whether to occupy the quantity decision leadership or not is conditional on the spillover intensity and the demand information value. We also identify certain conditions where the chain members can achieve a consensus on the quantity decision timing.

中文翻译：

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具有溢出效应和不对称需求信息的数量决策时间

这项研究调查了在不对称需求信息下，零售服务投资的溢出效应如何影响双通道供应链中数量决策的时间偏好。考虑制造商数量领导者游戏和零售商数量领导者游戏。应用信号博弈论的方法，我们表明，对于连锁成员，是否占据数量决策领导者取决于溢出强度和需求信息值。我们还确定了某些条件，在这些条件下，链成员可以就数量决定时间达成共识。