This article demonstrates that non-mechanistic, dynamical explanations are a viable approach to explanation in the special sciences. The claim that dynamical models can be explanatory without reference to mechanisms has previously been met with three lines of criticism from mechanists: the causal relevance concern, the genuine laws concern, and the charge of predictivism. I argue, however, that these mechanist criticisms fail to defeat non-mechanistic, dynamical explanation. Using the examples of Haken et al.’s ([1985]) model of bimanual coordination, and Thelen et al.’s ([2001]) dynamical field model of infant perseverative reaching, I show how each mechanist criticism fails once the standards of Woodward’s ([2003]) interventionist framework are applied to dynamical models. An even-handed application of Woodwardian interventionism reveals that dynamical models are capable of producing genuine explanations without appealing to underlying mechanistic details. 1. Introduction2. Interventionism and Mechanistic Explanation 2.1. Causal relevance and ideal interventions2.2. Invariance2.3. Explanation3. Covering-Laws and Dynamical Explanation 3.1. Dynamical models3.2. Covering-law explanation3.3. Prediction4. Causal Relevance 4.1. The causal relevance concern4.2. Intervening on dynamical models4.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model4.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model5. Genuine Laws 5.1. The genuine laws concern5.2. Using invariance in place of laws5.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model5.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model6. Prediction 6.1. Predictivism6.2. Crude and invariant prediction7. Interventionist Criticism of the Haken–Kelso–Bunz Model8. Dynamical Explanation8. Conclusion Introduction Interventionism and Mechanistic Explanation 2.1. Causal relevance and ideal interventions2.2. Invariance2.3. Explanation Causal relevance and ideal interventions Invariance Explanation Covering-Laws and Dynamical Explanation 3.1. Dynamical models3.2. Covering-law explanation3.3. Prediction Dynamical models Covering-law explanation Prediction Causal Relevance 4.1. The causal relevance concern4.2. Intervening on dynamical models4.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model4.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model The causal relevance concern Intervening on dynamical models Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model Test case II: Dynamical field model Genuine Laws 5.1. The genuine laws concern5.2. Using invariance in place of laws5.3. Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model5.4. Test case II: Dynamical field model The genuine laws concern Using invariance in place of laws Test case I: The Haken–Kelso–Bunz model Test case II: Dynamical field model Prediction 6.1. Predictivism6.2. Crude and invariant prediction Predictivism Crude and invariant prediction Interventionist Criticism of the Haken–Kelso–Bunz Model Dynamical Explanation Conclusion

中文翻译：

---

非机械选择：捍卫动力学解释

这篇文章表明，非机械的、动态的解释是特殊科学中一种可行的解释方法。动力学模型可以在不参考机制的情况下进行解释的说法此前遭到了机械论者的三条批评：因果相关性关注、真实规律关注和预测主义指控。然而，我认为这些机械论的批评未能击败非机械论的动态解释。使用 Haken 等人 ([1985]) 的双手协调模型和 Thelen 等人 ([2001]) 的婴儿坚持性到达的动态场模型的例子，我展示了每个机械论批评如何在标准失败后失败伍德沃德 ([2003]) 的干预主义框架适用于动态模型。伍德沃德干预主义的公平应用表明，动力学模型能够产生真正的解释，而无需诉诸潜在的机械细节。1. 介绍 2. 干预和机械解释 2.1。因果相关性和理想的干预措施 2.2。不变性2.3。说明3。覆盖律和动态解释 3.1．动力学模型3.2。覆盖法解释3.3。预测 4. 因果关系 4.1。因果相关性关注4.2。干预动态模型 4.3。测试案例 I：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 4.4。测试案例二：动力场模型5。真正的法律 5.1。真正的法律关注5.2。使用不变性代替法律 5.3。测试案例 I：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 5.4。测试案例二：动力场模型6。预测 6.1。预测主义6.2。粗略和不变的预测7。Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型的干预主义批评 8。动态解释 8. 结论 介绍 干预和机械解释 2.1．因果相关性和理想的干预措施 2.2。不变性2.3。解释因果相关性和理想干预不变性解释覆盖律和动态解释 3.1。动力学模型3.2。覆盖法解释3.3。预测动力学模型覆盖律解释预测因果相关性 4.1。因果相关性关注4.2。干预动态模型 4.3。测试案例 I：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 4.4。测试案例 II：动力场模型 因果相关性关注 干预动力模型 测试案例 I：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 测试案例 II：动力场模型 Genuine Laws 5.1。真正的法律关注5.2。使用不变性代替法律 5.3。测试案例一：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 5.4。测试案例 II：动力场模型 真正的定律涉及使用不变性代替定律 测试案例 I：Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型 测试案例 II：动力场模型预测 6.1。预测主义6.2。原始和不变预测 Predictivism 原始和不变预测 Haken-Kelso-Bunz 模型的干预批评 动力学解释结论