This article helps explain why incentive-based contracts have failed in some cities. It also explicitly shows how contracted kilometer- and passenger-based payments affect transit service quality. First, we study how contract renegotiations in 2012 and 2013 affected quality related to service kilometers in the bus public transport system of Santiago, Chile. To do that, we analyze the evolution of compliance measures and estimate the effect of renegotiations on key performance indicators. The main results are that the renegotiation of 2012 led to minor improvements in frequency compliance but deterioration in regularity, whereas the renegotiation of 2013 led to reduced fines for non-compliance with no change in frequency compliance and decreased regularity. Second, we formulate a model to analyze the behavior of a firm operating under a contract like the one in Santiago. We identify conditions that must be present for an operator to provide the contracted service kilometers, depending on the per-kilometer and per-passenger payments stipulated in the contract. The results of the analysis are empirically tested, and we conclude that the incentives in Santiago do not sufficiently incentivize contract compliance. A central result is a formula for payment per kilometer and payment per passenger when the objective is the provision of service kilometers.

本文有助于解释为什么基于奖励的合同在某些城市失败了。它还明确显示了合同的公里数和旅客支付方式如何影响过境服务质量。首先，我们研究了2012年和2013年的合同重新谈判如何影响智利圣地亚哥公交公共交通系统中与服务公里数相关的质量。为此，我们分析了合规措施的演变，并评估了重新谈判对关键绩效指标的影响。主要结果是，2012年的重新谈判导致频率合规性略有改善，但规则性恶化，而2013年的重新谈判导致不遵守频率的罚款减少，频率合规性不变且规则性降低。第二，我们制定了一个模型来分析像圣地亚哥这样的根据合同经营的公司的行为。我们根据合同中规定的每公里和每位乘客付款，确定运营商提供合同规定的服务公里所必须具备的条件。分析的结果经过经验检验，我们得出的结论是，圣地亚哥的激励措施不足以激励合同合规性。中心结果是一个公式，当目标是提供服务公里数时，每公里支付和每位乘客支付。我们得出的结论是，圣地亚哥的激励措施不足以激励合同合规性。中心结果是一个公式，当目标是提供服务公里数时，每公里支付和每位乘客支付。我们得出的结论是，圣地亚哥的激励措施不足以激励合同合规性。中心结果是一个公式，该公式是目标为提供服务公里数时的每公里支付和每位乘客的支付。