Abstract The Electric Power Research Institute outlined three criteria important for a commercially viable fusion power plant: competitive electric power cost, regulatory simplicity, and public acceptance. In this paper we consider likely U.S. regulatory considerations for deuterium-tritium (D-T) fusion power reactors, relying on existing criteria and past actions by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has asserted regulatory jurisdiction over U.S. commercial fusion reactors. We begin with consideration of a basic D-T fusion reactor, independent of plasma confinement approach. Because tritium and radioactivity are present, likely regulation will require containment structures and various safety measures for each component. Regulators are certain to require that all nuclear components of the system be housed in an overall containment vessel that must be held at less than atmospheric pressure to contain any leakage of tritium, radioactive corrosion products, radioactive coolant, and activated elements in the air. In addition, regulators are sure to require plant structure and operations that minimize the potential for clandestine plutonium breeding. Next, we add superconducting magnets and a plasma dump (divertor) to the basic system and recognize the small but nonzero probability of those magnets explosively quenching, potentially causing reactor damage and dramatically increasing containment vessel pressure. Finally, we consider ITER as prototypical of a D-T–fueled fusion power reactor. Because ITER-like systems are subject to damaging plasma disruptions, regulators are almost certain to require safeguards against such events significantly damaging first walls and subsystems. Finally, we believe that regulators are not likely to back off significantly in requirements related to the deuterium-deuterium and D3He fuel cycles even though the tritium production and the neutron damage in the latter fuel cycle are significantly below those in a D-T system. However, regulations for p11B and 3He3He fuel cycles are certain to be dramatically less demanding because of the lack of tritium and essentially no neutron production.

中文翻译：

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美国对 DT Fusion Power Reactor 可能的监管考虑

摘要 电力研究所概述了商业上可行的聚变发电厂的三个重要标准：具有竞争力的电力成本、监管简单性和公众接受度。在本文中，我们考虑了美国对氘氚 (DT) 聚变反应堆的监管考虑，这依赖于美国核管理委员会的现有标准和过去的行动，该委员会已断言对美国商业聚变反应堆的监管管辖权。我们首先考虑一个基本的 DT 聚变反应堆，独立于等离子体约束方法。由于存在氚和放射性，可能的监管将要求每个组件的安全壳结构和各种安全措施。监管机构肯定会要求系统的所有核部件都装在一个整体安全壳中，该安全壳必须保持在低于大气压的压力下，以遏制空气中氚、放射性腐蚀产物、放射性冷却剂和活化元素的任何泄漏。此外，监管机构肯定会要求工厂结构和运营将钚秘密繁殖的可能性降到最低。接下来，我们在基本系统中添加了超导磁体和等离子体转储器（导流器），并认识到这些磁体爆炸性淬火的可能性很小但非零，这可能会导致反应堆损坏并显着增加安全壳压力。最后，我们将 ITER 视为 DT 燃料聚变动力反应堆的原型。因为类似 ITER 的系统会受到破坏性的等离子体破坏，监管机构几乎肯定会要求采取保护措施，防止此类事件严重损坏第一层墙和子系统。最后，我们认为监管机构不太可能大幅降低与氘-氘和 D3He 燃料循环相关的要求，即使后者燃料循环中的氚产量和中子损伤显着低于 DT 系统中的要求。然而，由于缺乏氚且基本上不产生中子，p11B 和 3He3He 燃料循环的规定肯定会大大降低要求。我们认为，监管机构不太可能大幅降低与氘-氘和 D3He 燃料循环相关的要求，即使后者燃料循环中的氚产量和中子损伤显着低于 DT 系统中的要求。然而，由于缺乏氚且基本上不产生中子，p11B 和 3He3He 燃料循环的规定肯定会大大降低要求。我们认为，监管机构不太可能大幅降低与氘-氘和 D3He 燃料循环相关的要求，即使后者燃料循环中的氚产量和中子损伤显着低于 DT 系统中的要求。然而，由于缺乏氚且基本上不产生中子，p11B 和 3He3He 燃料循环的规定肯定会大大降低要求。