We consider auctions where bidders have external incentives and focus on the case where their valuations in the auction are positively correlated with their productivity which matters in a second stage job market. We study how this affects bidding behavior and wages in the job market and proceed to test the model’s implication in an experiment where treatments differ according to which bids are disclosed. Our results broadly confirm the theoretical prediction that bidders tend to overbid, and their bidding behavior and wages are influenced by the disclosure rule. The data also suggests that the dispersion in worker wages is affected by the disclosure rule, suggesting the importance of reputational bidding.

中文翻译：

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有外部激励的拍卖：实验证据

我们考虑竞标者有外部激励的拍卖，并关注他们在拍卖中的估值与其生产力正相关的情况，这在第二阶段的就业市场中很重要。我们研究这如何影响就业市场中的投标行为和工资，并继续在实验中测试模型的含义，其中处理根据公开的投标而不同。我们的研究结果广泛证实了投标人倾向于过度投标的理论预测，他们的投标行为和工资受到披露规则的影响。数据还表明，工人工资的分散受到披露规则的影响，表明声誉竞标的重要性。