This paper formulates duopoly competition between two non-cooperative heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms considering the adoption of electric vehicles (EV) and government subsidies on EVs. One ride-sourcing platform adopts an EV asset-heavy strategy by undertaking EV depreciation costs, while the other ride-sourcing platform adopts an asset-light strategy by hiring drivers who own vehicles. The first-order conditions of each platform's pricingunder competitive equilibrium are derived based on a game-theoretical model that involves the stakeholders (i.e., riders, drivers, and ride-sourcing platforms). Based on the modeling framework ofduopoly competition between two heterogeneous ride-sourcing platforms, this paper proposes an optimization model with social welfare maximization for the determination of governmentsubsidy strategies. We conduct numerical illustrations to demonstrate how governmental subsidies on EV purchase and charging stations impact the endogenous variables in equilibrium (e.g., price for riders, wage for drivers, and market share for each platform) under different formulations of riders' waiting time cost function, which are increasing returns to scale. Also, a specialmodel with a fixed commission ratio is discussed. The results provide suggestions for decision-makers on how to allocate subsidy within the budget constraint.

考虑到电动汽车的采用和政府对电动汽车的补贴，本文提出了两个非合作性异构骑行采购平台之间的双头竞争。一个骑行采购平台通过承担EV折旧成本来采用EV资产重战略，而另一个骑行采购平台通过雇用拥有车辆的驾驶员来采用轻资产战略。竞争均衡下每个平台定价的一阶条件是基于博弈论模型得出的，该博弈论模型涉及利益相关者（即，骑手，驾驶员和骑行采购平台）。基于两个异类乘车外包平台之间的双头竞争的建模框架，本文提出了一种具有社会福利最大化的优化模型，用于确定政府补贴策略。我们进行了数值图示，以说明在不同的乘车者等待时间成本函数公式下，政府对电动汽车购买和充电站的补贴如何影响均衡中的内生变量（例如，乘车者的价格，驾驶员的工资和每个平台的市场份额），这些都在增加规模收益。此外，讨论了具有固定佣金比率的特殊模型。研究结果为决策者提供了在预算约束范围内如何分配补贴的建议。这些都在增加规模收益。此外，讨论了具有固定佣金比率的特殊模型。研究结果为决策者提供了在预算约束范围内如何分配补贴的建议。这些都在增加规模收益。此外，讨论了具有固定佣金比率的特殊模型。研究结果为决策者提供了在预算约束范围内如何分配补贴的建议。