Abstract We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a buyer whose efforts jointly influence carbon emissions per unit of the product. The product demand is affected by the effort levels. The carbon footprint is allocated to the supply chain members by a social planner, and they pay carbon penalties for their allocated emissions. We first examine the social first-best solution and then analyze a no-collaboration scenario, where the supply chain members simultaneously make their own effort decisions under an allocation rule, and two supply chain contracting scenarios: credible buyer and double moral hazard, where the buyer designs and offers a contract to the supplier that specifies an order quantity and a payment scheme contingent on the realized carbon footprint. We find that the social planner may need to over- or under-allocate the emissions to the firms to induce the social first-best effort levels in the no-collaboration scenario. However, the social first-best effort levels can be attained with a simple allocation rule without over- or under-allocation in the credible buyer scenario. For the double moral hazard scenario, where the buyer is not credible to the supplier, the social first-best may not be attainable and there may be a significant loss in the social value of the supply chain.

中文翻译：

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碳减排的供应链投资与承包：一个社会规划者的视角

摘要 我们考虑由供应商和买方组成的供应链，他们的努力共同影响单位产品的碳排放。产品需求受努力程度的影响。碳足迹由社会规划者分配给供应链成员，他们为其分配的排放量支付碳罚金。我们首先检查社会优先解决方案，然后分析一个不合作的场景，其中供应链成员在分配规则下同时做出自己的努力决策，以及两个供应链承包场景：可信买家和双重道德风险，其中买方设计并向供应商提供合同，该合同指定订单数量和支付方案，具体取决于已实现的碳足迹。我们发现，社会规划者可能需要向企业过度或不足分配排放，以在不合作的情况下诱导社会第一最佳努力水平。然而，在可信买家的情况下，可以通过简单的分配规则实现社会第一尽力水平，而不会出现过度分配或分配不足的情况。对于双重道德风险情景，买方对供应商不可信，社会第一可能无法实现，供应链的社会价值可能会出现重大损失。