Constructing S-boxes that are inherently resistant against side-channel attacks is an important problem in cryptography. By using an optimal distinguisher under an additive Gaussian noise assumption, we clarify how a defender (resp., an attacker) can make side-channel attacks as difficult (resp., easy) as possible, in relation with the auto-correlation spectrum of Boolean functions. We then construct balanced Boolean functions that are optimal for each of these two scenarios. Generalizing the objectives for an S-box, we analyze the auto-correlation spectra of some well-known S-box constructions in dimensions at most 8 and compare their intrinsic resiliency against side-channel attacks. Finally, we perform several simulations of side-channel attacks against the aforementioned constructions, which confirm our theoretical approach.

中文翻译：

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S-Box 抵御侧通道攻击的内在弹性__最坏的情况


构建本质上能够抵抗侧信道攻击的 S 盒是密码学中的一个重要问题。通过在加性高斯噪声假设下使用最佳区分器，我们阐明了防御者（或攻击者）如何使侧信道攻击尽可能困难（或简单），与自相关谱相关布尔函数。然后，我们构建对于这两种情况都是最佳的平衡布尔函数。概括 S 盒的目标，我们分析了一些著名的 S 盒结构的自相关谱（维度最多为 8），并比较了它们针对旁路攻击的内在弹性。最后，我们对上述结构进行了多次侧信道攻击模拟，这证实了我们的理论方法。