In this paper, we study the extent to which net neutrality, defined as price non-discrimination, is welfare improving in comparison to non-net-neutrality. We consider a two-sided congested internet service provider (ISP) that acts as a monopoly platform. The congestion is basically caused by the overuse of the fixed ISP’s bandwidth by content providers. Unlike end-users, we allow content providers to be heterogeneous in their sensitivity to congestion. The analysis reveals that the ISP monopolist, by departing from the net neutrality regime, price-favors the most congestion sensitive providers. We argue that these providers play a crucial role in creating traffic and generating profit for the ISP platform. In our paper, whether net neutrality improves or harms social welfare depends on a critical threshold of the platform equilibrium congestion level. This threshold is an indicator or a proxy that indicates for a planner whether or not net neutrality rules should be repealed. When the platform congestion level lies below the threshold, we show that non-net-neutrality makes the society better-off. Exceeding the threshold, two effects are identified: profit-increase effect and consumers’ surplus-reduction effect. If the latter outweighs the former, net neutrality increases social welfare when compared to non-net-neutrality.

中文翻译：

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拥挤价格歧视下的网络中立效率

在本文中，我们研究了净中立性（定义为价格非歧视）与非中立性相比在多大程度上改善了福利。我们考虑充当垄断平台的双向拥塞互联网服务提供商（ISP）。拥塞基本上是由内容提供商过度使用固定ISP的带宽引起的。与最终用户不同，我们允许内容提供者对拥塞的敏感度不同。分析表明，ISP垄断者通过偏离网络中立制度，对最拥挤敏感的提供商有利。我们认为，这些提供商在为ISP平台创造流量和创造利润方面起着至关重要的作用。在我们的论文中 净中立性是改善还是损害社会福利取决于平台平衡拥挤水平的关键阈值。此阈值是为计划者指示是否应废除网络中立性规则的指标或代理。当平台拥塞水平低于阈值时，我们表明非网络中立性使社会变得更加富裕。超过阈值，确定了两个效应：利润增加效应和消费者剩余减少效应。如果后者大于前者，那么与非网络中立相比，网络中立会增加社会福利。我们证明，非网络中立性使社会变得更加富裕。超过阈值，确定了两个效应：利润增加效应和消费者剩余减少效应。如果后者大于前者，那么与非网络中立相比，网络中立会增加社会福利。我们证明，非网络中立性使社会变得更加富裕。超过阈值，确定了两个效应：利润增加效应和消费者剩余减少效应。如果后者大于前者，那么与非网络中立相比，网络中立会增加社会福利。