ABSTRACT

The study considers two supply chain members, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new and remanufactured products and an independent remanufacturer (IR) collecting used products of OEM and producing remanufactured products. Furthermore, OEM and IR are involved in competition to collect the used products by providing various exciting offers to the customers. A two period analytical model is developed to investigate the profitable buyback strategy for OEM and IR under low and high pricing strategy. In first period, OEM performs remanufacturing and considers a strategy to collect the product cores from end users under a certain pricing strategy. Under extensive game format, IR joins in the remanufacturing business to compete with OEM and based on OEM's attractive buyback strategy, IR adopts a profitable pricing strategy. The research addresses oligopoly market where OEM is not the single seller of new product and other sellers are interested in remanufacturing. In such scenario, OEM has less control over used products collection of other brand and OEM cannot restrict independent remanufacturer to venture within remanufacturing business. The findings of the study depicted that low pricing strategy “exchange offer” is profitable buyback decision for OEM and “incentive offer” is profitable buyback decision for independent remanufacturer.

摘要

该研究考虑了两个供应链成员，一个生产新产品和再制造产品的原始设备制造商 (OEM) 和一个收集 OEM 使用过的产品并生产再制造产品的独立再制造商 (IR)。此外，OEM 和 IR 参与竞争，通过向客户提供各种令人兴奋的优惠来收集使用过的产品。开发了一个两期分析模型来研究低价和高价策略下 OEM 和 IR 的盈利回购策略。在第一阶段，OEM 进行再制造，并考虑在一定的定价策略下从最终用户那里收集产品核心的策略。在广泛的博弈形式下，IR加入再制造业务与OEM竞争，基于OEM有吸引力的回购策略，IR采用盈利定价策略。该研究针对寡头市场，其中 OEM 不是新产品的单一卖家，其他卖家对再制造感兴趣。在这种情况下，OEM 对其他品牌的旧产品收集控制较少，OEM 不能限制独立再制造商在再制造业务中冒险。研究结果表明，低价策略“交换报价”是 OEM 有利可图的回购决策，而“激励报价”是独立再制造商有利可图的回购决策。