During humanitarian relief operations, designated facilities are established to assist the affected population and distribute relief goods. In settings where the authorities manage the operations, they instruct the population regarding which facility they should visit. However, in times of crises and uncertainty, these instructions are often not followed. In this work, we investigate how the authorities should invest in incentivizing the population to follow their instructions. These decisions need to be combined with those concerning the relief network design. The population’s behavior and level of cooperation are key factors in deciding on the incentive investments.

We present a new mathematical model that incorporates decisions regarding which populations to incentivize to follow the local authorities’ instructions. Then, we develop properties that can help the authorities decide on the level of investment in incentives. A numerical study demonstrates that incentives can improve the system’s performance and enable an equitable supply allocation. Furthermore, an investment in a small number of communities is typically sufficient to significantly improve the system’s performance. We also demonstrate that incentives affect relief-network design decisions.

在人道主义救济行动中，建立了指定的设施来援助受影响的人口并分发救济物资。在当局管理行动的环境中，他们指示民众应参观的设施。但是，在危机和不确定性时期，通常不会遵循这些指示。在这项工作中，我们调查了当局应如何投资激励人们遵循他们的指示。这些决定需要与有关救济网络设计的决定结合起来。人口的行为和合作水平是决定奖励投资的关键因素。

我们提出了一个新的数学模型，该模型结合了有关激励哪些人群来遵循当地政府指示的决策。然后，我们开发可以帮助当局确定激励措施投资水平的物业。一项数值研究表明，激励措施可以改善系统的绩效并实现公平的供应分配。此外，对少数社区的投资通常足以显着提高系统的性能。我们还证明了激励措施会影响救济网络的设计决策。