Abstract Sea-level rise due to climate change is clearly an important problem. This paper uses game theory in conjunction with discounting to explore strategies by which governments might encourage pre-disaster relocation by residents living in areas at high risk of flooding due to sea-level rise. We find that offering a subsidy (e.g., a partial buyout) can be effective if government has a significantly lower discount rate than residents. We also present extensions to our model, exploring the use of a fixed annual benefit after relocation (instead of a one-time subsidy), and hyperbolic instead of standard exponential discounting. Numerical sensitivity analysis elucidates many important factors affecting the timing of anticipatory relocation, since for example relocating too soon may be costly to both residents and government if flooding risk is increasing only gradually. This conceptual model also provides a foundation for future studies that quantify the model with more realistic parameter values (e.g., realistic estimates of flooding probabilities), and alternative behavioral models of resident decision making.

中文翻译：

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灾前搬迁博弈论建模

摘要 气候变化导致海平面上升显然是一个重要问题。本文将博弈论与贴现相结合，探讨政府可采取哪些策略来鼓励居住在因海平面上升而面临洪水高风险地区的居民灾前搬迁。我们发现，如果政府的贴现率明显低于居民，则提供补贴（例如，部分收购）可能是有效的。我们还展示了我们模型的扩展，探索使用搬迁后固定的年度福利（而不是一次性补贴），以及双曲线而不是标准的指数贴现。数值敏感性分析阐明了许多影响预期搬迁时机的重要因素，因为例如，如果洪水风险只是逐渐增加，那么过早搬迁可能会给居民和政府带来代价。这个概念模型还为未来的研究奠定了基础，这些研究使用更现实的参数值（例如，洪水概率的现实估计）和居民决策的替代行为模型来量化模型。