Abstract For critical and strategic materials such as a rare earth element or crude oil, we study a supply chain consisting of an intermediary/producer facing a highly volatile market to its customers and a local supplier at a different region subject to a fixed term supply contract. By viewing the opportunity to sign this contract as a real option, we construct a supply contract model and analytically derive the optimal contract-signing threshold price from the intermediary/producer perspective. Based on this threshold, we show how the relationship among the threshold price, lead time, and contract duration results in a classification of the supply chain’s preferences for lead time length, and to concrete guidelines for using the lead time and contract duration as tradable negotiation tools for supply chain contracts.

中文翻译：

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高波动性关键和战略材料的供应合同及其对供应链的影响

摘要 对于稀土元素或原油等关键和战略材料，我们研究了一个供应链，该供应链由一个中间商/生产商组成，该中间商/生产商面向其客户面临高度波动的市场，另一个地区的本地供应商受固定期限供应合同约束。 . 通过将签订该合同的机会视为一种实物期权，我们构建了一个供应合同模型，并从中间人/生产者的角度分析推导出了最优合同签订门槛价格。基于这个阈值，我们展示了阈值价格、提前期和合同期限之间的关系如何导致供应链对提前期长度偏好的分类，以及使用提前期和合同期限作为可交易谈判的具体指南供应链合同工具。