We present a newly designed market experiment to study regulatory issues in markets with advice inspired by the models of Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) and Inderst (2015). In line with our predictions, our experimental markets create conflicts of interest and unsuitable advice biased toward high-commission products. We examine whether two frequently discussed regulation measures -- disclosure and fines for unsuitable advice -- reduce commission payments and improve advice. None of the regulation measures result in lower commissions and more suitable advice, however, and advice is equally biased in all treatments. Furthermore, with disclosure, conflicts of interest are enlarged, offsetting the potentially restraining effects of disclosure. The potential impact of various behavioral factors is discussed to encourage further research.

中文翻译：

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以建议监管市场：一项实验研究

我们提出了一项新设计的市场实验，以研究市场监管问题，并提供受 Inderst 和 Ottaviani（2012a）和 Inderst（2015）模型启发的建议。与我们的预测一致，我们的实验性市场会产生利益冲突以及偏向于高佣金产品的不合适建议。我们研究了两项经常讨论的监管措施——对不合适建议的披露和罚款——是否减少了佣金支付并改善了建议。然而，这些监管措施都没有带来更低的佣金和更合适的建议，而且建议在所有处理中都同样有偏见。此外，随着披露，利益冲突被扩大，抵消了披露的潜在约束效果。讨论了各种行为因素的潜在影响，以鼓励进一步的研究。