Communication can arise when the interests of speaker and listener diverge if the cost of signaling is high enough that it aligns their interests. But what happens when the cost of signaling is not sufficient to align their interests? Using methods from experimental economics, we test whether theoretical predictions of a partially informative system of communication are borne out. As our results indicate, partial communication can occur even when interests do not coincide.

中文翻译：

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没有共同兴趣的交流：信号实验。

当发信号者和听者的利益发生分歧时，如果发信号的成本足够高，足以使他们的利益保持一致，那么交流就会产生。但是，当信令成本不足以使他们的利益保持一致时，会发生什么呢？使用实验经济学的方法，我们测试了是否可以对部分信息交流系统的理论预测进行证实。正如我们的结果所表明的，即使利益不一致，也会发生部分交流。