An effective way to detect the presence of a spoofing attack is to verify Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data with measurements from other sensors, such as inertial navigation systems (INSs). In this article, uncoupled GNSS/INS-verification approaches are experimentally evaluated in an automotive context. The approaches are uncoupled in the sense that GNSS and INS sensors are operated independently without an exchange of information. The techniques considered are the magnitude verification (MAV) technique, where the acceleration and angular velocity magnitudes are compared, and the horizontal components (HoCs)-verification strategy, which requires the vertical alignment of GNSS and INS sensor frames. The analysis shows the effectiveness of these types of procedures and discusses their limitations; for example, in low-dynamic conditions, when low accelerations and angular velocities are recorded. Possible enhancements are also discussed.

中文翻译：

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车载应用的 GNSS/INS 验证策略的实验评估

检测是否存在欺骗攻击的有效方法是使用来自惯性导航系统 (INS) 等其他传感器的测量值来验证全球导航卫星系统 (GNSS) 数据。在本文中，非耦合 GNSS/INS 验证方法在汽车环境中进行了实验评估。在 GNSS 和 INS 传感器独立运行而无需交换信息的意义上，这些方法是分离的。所考虑的技术是幅度验证 (MAV) 技术，其中比较加速度和角速度幅度，以及水平分量 (HoC) 验证策略，这需要 GNSS 和 INS 传感器框架的垂直对齐。分析显示了这些类型程序的有效性并讨论了它们的局限性；例如，在低动态条件下，当记录低加速度和角速度时。还讨论了可能的增强功能。