Cooperation is generally the most advantageous strategy for the group; however, on an individual level, cheating is frequently more attractive. In a fishery, one can choose to cooperate by fishing only the regulated amount or not to cooperate, by fishing to maximize profits. Top-down management can help to emulate a cooperative result in fisheries, but it is costly and not always a viable alternative for development states. Here, we investigate elements of a fishing system that can be strategically managed to encourage a cooperative behaviour. Using bioeconomic data, we modelled an evolutionary game between two populations of fishers that differ if they cooperate or do not cooperate with a fishing restriction. We penalized players including risk tolerance and control perception, two social parameters that might favour cooperation. We assessed the degrees to which risk tolerance and control perception affect the cooperative behaviours of fishers in a restricted fishing effort small-scale fishery (RSSF) in southern Brazil. We also assessed the likelihood of a scenario wherein a cooperative strategy can evolve and dominate the system. We identified dominance and coexistence outcomes for the RSSF. Sensitivity analyses suggested that both control perception and risk tolerance could facilitate a cooperative outcome for the fishery.

合作通常是该集团最有利的策略；但是，就个人而言，作弊通常更具吸引力。在渔业中，人们可以选择仅捕捞规定数量的捕捞进行合作，或者选择不捕捞进行捕捞，以使利润最大化。自上而下的管理可以帮助模仿渔业中的合作成果，但是它成本高昂，而且对于发展国家而言并非总是可行的选择。在这里，我们调查可以策略性地鼓励合作行为的捕鱼系统的要素。使用生物经济数据，我们对两个渔民群体之间的进化博弈进行了建模，而这两个渔民群体是否合作或不配合捕捞限制。我们惩罚了参与者，包括风险承受能力和控制感，这是两个可能有助于合作的社会参数。我们评估了风险容忍度和控制感影响巴西南部受限捕捞努力小型渔业（RSSF）中渔民合作行为的程度。我们还评估了合作策略可以演变并主导系统的情况的可能性。我们确定了RSSF的优势地位和共存成果。敏感性分析表明，控制感知和风险承受能力都可以促进渔业的合作成果。