This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co‐ops) and investor‐owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co‐op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co‐op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co‐ops exert vis‐à‐vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co‐op behavior questions.

中文翻译：

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农业加工企业的腐败：合作社与投资者所有企业的比较

本文研究了合作社（CO）和投资者拥有的公司（IOF）中的管理腐败，包括其对价格和农民福利的影响。即使由于合作社的产量增加，合作社经理有更大的诱因从事腐败活动，但由此产生的腐败也不足以抵消合作社对IOF产生的竞争影响。无论生产功能的功能形式，农场投入的供应曲线和加工产品的需求曲线如何，该结论均成立。除了显示竞争效应的鲁棒性之外，本文还提供了一个高度灵活的建模框架，可用于检查其他合作社行为问题。