The paper deals with a class of parameterized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the second kind, whose Lipschitzian stability, under appropriate conditions, is established. This theory is then applied to evolution of an oligopolistic market in which the firms adapt their production strategies to changing input costs, while each change of the production is associated with some “costs of change”. We examine both the Cournot-Nash equilibria as well as the two-level case, when one firm decides to take over the role of the Leader (Stackelberg equilibrium). The impact of costs of change is illustrated by academic examples.

本文涉及一类参数化的均衡问题，其中参与者的目标确实具有非光滑项。可以通过第二类参数相关的变分不等式来表征各个纳什均衡，在适当条件下建立其Lipschitzian稳定性。然后，将这种理论应用于寡头市场的演变，在这种情况下，企业将其生产策略调整为适应投入成本的变化，而每次生产变化都与某些“变化成本”相关。当一家公司决定接管领导者的角色时（斯塔克尔伯格均衡），我们研究了古诺—纳什均衡以及两级情况。学术实例说明了变更成本的影响。