In a two-echelon single-supplier and single-retailer supply chain with permissible delay in payment, we investigate the two-level trade credit policy in which the supplier offers the retailer with limited capital a credit period and in turn the retailer also provides a credit period to customers. The demand rate is sensitive to both retail price and the customerso credit period. By using the backward induction method, we analytically derive the unique equilibrium of both credit periods in the Stackelberg game to determine the retaileros pricing strategy. We find that the optimal retail price is not always decreasing in the credit period offered by the supplier to the retailer. In addition, we characterize the conditions under which the retailer is willing to voluntarily provide customers a credit period. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis of key parameters are presented to illustrate the theoretical results and managerial insights.

中文翻译：

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两级贸易信贷下的最优信贷期

在允许延迟付款的两级单供应商和单零售商供应链中，我们研究了两级贸易信贷政策，其中供应商为零售商提供了有限的资本信贷期，反过来，零售商还提供了一个信贷额度。信用期给客户。需求率对零售价格和客户信用期均敏感。通过使用反向归纳法，我们在Stackelberg博弈中分析得出两个信用期的唯一均衡，以确定零售商的定价策略。我们发现，最佳零售价格在供应商提供给零售商的信用期内并不总是下降。此外，我们描述了零售商愿意自愿为客户提供信用期的条件。