In the original manufacturing industry, upstream encroachment has become a universal commercial phenomenon. This paper considers a coopetition supply chain consisting of an upstream original design manufacturer (ODM) and a downstream original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and proposes a dynamic Cournot game under bounded rationality. To cope with a dynamic repeated game in discrete time, a gradient adjustment mechanism is adopted. Furthermore, bifurcation diagram, largest Lyapunov exponent, basin of attraction, and critical curve are introduced to investigate the dynamic behavior of this game. The results obtained show that as the firms’ policy adjustment speeds increase, the stability region of the dynamic system gradually narrows, but one special finding is that the complex behavior of the dynamic system is alleviated as the OEM’s adjustment speed greatly increases. Moreover, when the difference between the two firms’ adjustment speeds is relatively small, the dynamic adjustment strategy is beneficial to the coopetition supply chain and both firms under certain adjustment speeds, as compared to a one-shot game. In addition, a higher product substitutability has a positive impact on the system stability, pushing the “cooperation” business alliance towards a more coordinated outcome.

中文翻译：

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竞合供应链中的动态古诺博弈分析。

在原始制造业中，上游入侵已经成为普遍的商业现象。本文考虑了由上游原始设计制造商（ODM）和下游原始设备制造商（OEM）组成的竞合供应链，并提出了在有限理性下的动态古诺博弈。为了应对离散时间的动态重复博弈，采用了梯度调整机制。此外，引入分叉图，最大Lyapunov指数，吸引盆和临界曲线来研究该游戏的动态行为。结果表明，随着企业政策调整速度的加快，动态系统的稳定区域逐渐缩小，但是一个特别的发现是，随着OEM的调整速度大大提高，动态系统的复杂行为得到了缓解。而且，当两家公司的调整速度之间的差异相对较小时，与单机游戏相比，动态调整策略对竞争竞争供应链和两家公司都具有一定的调整速度是有利的。此外，更高的产品可替代性对系统稳定性有积极影响，从而推动“合作”业务联盟朝着更加协调的结果发展。