System-theoretic process analysis is a hazard identification method whose main assumption is that accidents can be caused by unsafe interactions of system components, as well as component failures. System-theoretic process analysis can cover a wider range of hazards compared with traditional hazard analysis methods, such as software flaws, human errors, component failures, and complex interactions of system components. Identifying more hazards is of course an important advantage of system-theoretic process analysis, but generating too many hazards may pose a practical challenge to stakeholders to utilize the results of system-theoretic process analysis. Some hazards or scenarios may be more critical with higher consequence, while others can be less critical with lower consequence. We therefore need to evaluate the analysis results to focus on more critical and important problems first, when we do not have enough time and resources. The main objective of this study has been to suggest an additional procedure to system-theoretic process analysis to ensure a systematic evaluation, screening, and prioritization of analysis results. The risk priority number approach was adopted to evaluate the criticality of the results of analyses. After investigating the strengths and limitations of traditional risk priority number approaches, three new risk priority number criteria along with four additional procedure steps were added to the system-theoretic process analysis for evaluation, screening, and prioritization of system-theoretic process analysis results. The proposed criteria and procedure have been demonstrated with a case study of a subsea gas compression system, and for this particular analysis, it was suggested that 38 of 130 unsafe control actions and 258 of 976 loss scenarios were significantly less critical and screened out, so that the resources could be prioritized to solve the remaining findings. Meanwhile, prioritization is still a rather new topic with system-theoretic process analysis, and in the end of the article, we have identified some ideas for further research in this area.

系统理论过程分析是一种危害识别方法，其主要假设是事故可能由系统组件之间不安全的交互以及组件故障引起。与传统的危害分析方法相比，系统理论的过程分析可以涵盖更广泛的危害，例如软件缺陷，人为错误，组件故障以及系统组件的复杂交互。识别更多的危害当然是系统理论过程分析的重要优势，但是产生过多的危害可能会给利益相关者使用系统理论过程分析的结果带来实际挑战。某些危害或场景可能会产生更高的后果，而更为关键，而另一些危害或场景则可能会产生更低的后果，但其危害却不那么严重。因此，当我们没有足够的时间和资源时，我们需要评估分析结果，以便首先关注更关键和重要的问题。这项研究的主要目的是为系统理论过程分析提出一个额外的程序，以确保系统地评估，筛选和确定分析结果的优先级。采用了风险优先级数字方法来评估分析结果的重要性。在研究了传统风险优先级数字方法的优势和局限性之后，将三个新的风险优先级数字标准以及四个附加程序步骤添加到系统理论过程分析中，以评估，筛选和确定系统理论过程分析结果的优先级。一项拟议的标准和程序已通过海底气体压缩系统的案例研究得到了证明，对于此特定分析，建议在130个不安全的控制措施中有38个在976个损失情景中有258个被排除在外，因此将其排除在外。可以将资源优先用于解决其余的发现。同时，在系统理论过程分析中，优先级仍然是一个相当新的话题，在本文的最后，我们已经确定了一些需要进一步研究的想法。