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Private sector participation and incentive coordination of actors in REDD+
Forest Policy and Economics ( IF 4.0 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2020.102262
Jichuan Sheng

Abstract How do different contractual arrangements affect the behavior of private investors in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+)? How to attract private investors to participate in REDD+? The complex entanglement between REDD+ and private investors has received relatively little attention in existing studies. To respond to this gap, this paper examines the dynamic effects of benefit-sharing, cost-sharing, and incentive-coordination contracts on actors' behavior during the project period by using a theoretical framework based on differential games. It argues that incentive-coordination contracts in REDD+ are a fair and effective mechanism, as they can not only motivate actors to reduce emissions, but also ensure the equality of all actors' decision-making status. The market-oriented incentive structure constructed by incentive-coordination contracts helps to overcome the shortcomings of the current REDD+ contracts that rely on command-and-control instruments, and helps to improve the total profits of REDD+ projects. While questions remain about how to integrate incentive-coordination mechanisms into REDD+, incentive-coordination contracts can improve private investors' understanding of the value and risks of REDD+ projects by negotiating the optimal benefit-distribution rate. Incentive-coordination contracts are, therefore, a viable solution to attract private sector participation in REDD+.

中文翻译:

私营部门参与和 REDD+ 参与者的激励协调

摘要 不同的合同安排如何影响私人投资者在减少森林砍伐和退化所致排放(REDD+)方面的行为?如何吸引私人投资者参与REDD+?在现有研究中,REDD+ 与私人投资者之间的复杂纠缠相对较少受到关注。针对这一差距,本文利用基于微分博弈的理论框架,考察了利益分享、成本分担和激励协调契约对项目期间行动者行为的动态影响。认为REDD+中的激励协调契约是一种公平有效的机制,不仅可以激励行动者减少排放,而且保证所有行动者的决策地位平等。激励协调合约构建的市场化激励结构,有助于克服目前REDD+合约依赖指挥控制工具的弊端,有助于提升REDD+项目的总利润。尽管关于如何将激励协调机制整合到 REDD+ 中仍然存在问题,但激励协调合同可以通过协商最优收益分配率来提高私人投资者对 REDD+ 项目价值和风险的理解。因此,激励协调合同是吸引私营部门参与 REDD+ 的可行解决方案。尽管关于如何将激励协调机制整合到 REDD+ 中仍然存在问题,但激励协调合同可以通过协商最优收益分配率来提高私人投资者对 REDD+ 项目价值和风险的理解。因此,激励协调合同是吸引私营部门参与 REDD+ 的可行解决方案。尽管关于如何将激励协调机制整合到 REDD+ 中仍然存在问题,但激励协调合同可以通过协商最优收益分配率来提高私人投资者对 REDD+ 项目价值和风险的理解。因此,激励协调合同是吸引私营部门参与 REDD+ 的可行解决方案。
更新日期:2020-09-01
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