We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three axioms: separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and separation lower invariant. Each axiom is a natural restriction on how mechanisms can react when agents change their opinion about the relative ranking of any two adjacently ranked groups of alternatives. Our result extends a result from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017), a decomposition of strategyproofness for strict preferences, to the full domain that includes weak preferences.

中文翻译：

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无差异序数机制的策略证明公理分解

我们研究了在承认无差异的弱偏好的整个域上对有序偏好信息（即，备选的排序列表）进行操作的机制。我们将策略证明的新颖分解为三个公理：分离单调、分离上不变量和分离下不变量。每个公理都是对机制如何反应的自然限制，当代理改变他们对任何两个相邻排列的备选组的相对排名的看法时。我们的结果将来自 (Mennle and Seuken, 2017) 的结果（严格偏好的策略证明分解）扩展到包括弱偏好的完整域。