The operation of future intelligent transportation systems (ITSs), communications infrastructure (CI), and power grids (PGs) will be highly interdependent. In particular, autonomous connected vehicles require CI resources to operate, and, thus, communication failures can result in non-optimality in the ITS flow in terms of traffic jams and fuel consumption. Similarly, CI components, e.g., base stations (BSs) can be impacted by failures in the electric grid that is powering them. Thus, malicious attacks on the PG can lead to failures in both the CI and the ITSs. To this end, in this paper, the security of an ITS against indirect attacks carried out through the PG is studied in an interdependent PG-CI-ITS scenario. To defend against such attacks, the administrator of the interdependent critical infrastructure can allocate backup power sources (BPSs) at every BS to compensate for the power loss caused by the attacker. However, due to budget limitations, the administrator must consider the importance of each BS in light of the PG risk of failure, while allocating the BPSs. In this regard, a rigorous analytical framework is proposed to model the interdependencies between the ITS, CI, and PG. Next, a one-to-one relationship between the PG components and ITS streets is derived in order to capture the effect of the PG components' failure on the optimality of the traffic flow in the streets. Moreover, the problem of BPS allocation is formulated using a Stackelberg game framework and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the game is characterized. Simulation results show that the derived SE outperforms any other BPS allocation strategy and can be scalable in linear time with respect to the size of the interdependent infrastructure.

中文翻译：

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安全智能交通系统的相互依赖感知博弈论框架

未来智能交通系统 (ITS)、通信基础设施 (CI) 和电网 (PG) 的运行将高度相互依存。特别是，自动联网车辆需要 CI 资源才能运行，因此，通信故障可能导致 ITS 流在交通拥堵和燃料消耗方面的非优化。类似地，CI 组件，例如基站 (BS)，可能会受到为其供电的电网故障的影响。因此，对 PG 的恶意攻击会导致 CI​​ 和 ITS 失败。为此，在本文中，在相互依赖的 PG-CI-ITS 场景中研究了 ITS 针对通过 PG 进行的间接攻击的安全性。为了抵御此类攻击，相互依赖的关键基础设施的管理员可以在每个 BS 分配备用电源 (BPS)，以补偿攻击者造成的电力损失。但是，由于预算限制，管理员在分配 BPS 时必须根据 PG 失败的风险考虑每个 BS 的重要性。在这方面，提出了一个严格的分析框架来模拟 ITS、CI 和 PG 之间的相互依赖关系。接下来，推导出 PG 组件和 ITS 街道之间的一对一关系，以捕获 PG 组件故障对街道交通流优化的影响。此外，BPS 分配问题是使用 Stackelberg 博弈框架制定的，并表征了博弈的 Stackelberg 均衡（SE）。