Abstract This paper examines how honey bee population dynamics, the scale and timing of almond bloom, and unmarketability of almond honey interact to create misaligned incentives for growers and beekeepers in the California almond pollination services market. We combine economic contract theory with data from the first pollination contract survey to examine the design of pollination contracts. 89.2% of respondents used contracts with minimum colony population requirements, suggesting that all colonies are not considered to be equal providers of pollination services. Contracts that involved enforcement every year provided the highest pollination fees on average, while those with no enforcement provided the lowest fees. We contribute to the literature regarding pollination services by demonstrating that the number of hives and price per hive present an incomplete picture of almond pollination transactions without information regarding colony strength requirements and enforcement. We also provide a theoretical rationale for why almond pollination agreements have anecdotally become more formal over time: as the marginal value of colony strength increases, the grower offers the beekeeper stronger incentives to provide high colony strength. California almond production is an extreme case of a crop relying almost solely on managed pollinators, but ultimately could reflect the future for many pollinator-dependent crops if pollinator populations continue to decrease while monoculture crop production increases.

中文翻译：

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所有的殖民地都是平等的吗？蜂蜜蜂群强度在杏仁授粉合同中的作用

摘要 本文研究了蜜蜂种群动态、杏仁开花的规模和时间以及杏仁蜂蜜的不可销售性如何相互作用，从而为加利福尼亚杏仁授粉服务市场的种植者和养蜂人创造了错位的激励措施。我们将经济契约理论与第一次授粉合同调查的数据相结合，检验授粉合同的设计。89.2% 的受访者使用了具有最低群体人口要求的合同，这表明并非所有群体都被视为平等的授粉服务提供者。每年涉及执法的合同平均提供最高的授粉费，而没有执法的合同提供的费用最低。我们通过证明蜂巢数量和每个蜂巢的价格呈现了杏仁授粉交易的不完整画面，而没有关于菌落强度要求和执行的信息，从而为有关授粉服务的文献做出贡献。我们还提供了为什么杏仁授粉协议随着时间的推移变得更加正式的理论依据：随着蜂群强度的边际价值增加，种植者向养蜂人提供更强的激励以提供高蜂群强度。加州杏仁生产是一种几乎完全依赖受管理授粉媒介的作物的极端情况，但如果授粉媒介数量继续减少而单一作物产量增加，最终可能反映许多依赖授粉媒介的作物的未来。