This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show that there are two kinds of hospitals in this repeated environment: some hospitals can be motivated dynamically to voluntarily reduce their hiring capacity, potentially making more residents available to rural hospitals; the others, however, are untouchable even with repeated interaction and must obtain the same match as they do in a static matching. In large matching markets with correlated preferences, at most a vanishingly small fraction of the hospitals are untouchable. The vast majority of hospitals can be motivated using dynamic incentives.

中文翻译：

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重复匹配市场的稳定性

本文开发了一个重复匹配市场的框架。该模型与 Gale-Shapley 匹配模型不同，每个时期都有一组固定的长寿命医院与新一代短寿命居民匹配。我表明，在这种重复的环境中，有两种医院：一些医院可以动态地主动减少他们的招聘能力，从而有可能让更多的居民进入农村医院；然而，其他的即使重复交互也是不可触及的，并且必须获得与静态匹配相同的匹配。在具有相关偏好的大型匹配市场中，最多只有极少数医院是不可触及的。可以使用动态激励来激励绝大多数医院。