Abstract Employing the differential game theory, this study proposes the dynamic incentive model for knowledge sharing in Design-Build joint ventures (DBJVs) under three types of contracts: no cost-sharing contract (NCSC), cost-sharing contract (CSC) and centralized decision-making contract (CDMC). The analytic model and numerical analysis approach are used to compare solutions in the three scenarios. The results indicate that the optimal amount of shared knowledge and the optimal payoff under the CDMC are both the highest. Besides, the leader will offer part of the knowledge sharing cost for the follower if the leader gets more than one-third payoff of the system. Compared with the NCSC, the system payoff under the CSC increases greatly, which is much larger than the payoff increment from the CSC to the CDMC. Furthermore, empirical evidence on major findings are provided. This research contributes to the literature on knowledge sharing in joint ventures.

中文翻译：

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建筑合资企业知识共享的激励与合同设计

摘要 本研究运用微分博弈理论，提出了三种合同下设计-建造合资企业（DBJVs）知识共享的动态激励模型：无成本分摊合同（NCSC）、成本分摊合同（CSC）和集中式决策合同（CDMC）。分析模型和数值分析方法用于比较三种情况下的解决方案。结果表明，在 CDMC 下，共享知识的最优数量和最优收益都最高。此外，如果领导者获得超过系统三分之一的回报，领导者将为追随者提供部分知识共享成本。与NCSC相比，CSC下的系统收益大幅增加，远大于CSC到CDMC的收益增量。此外，提供了关于主要发现的经验证据。这项研究有助于有关合资企业知识共享的文献。