In a duopoly market where exists technological differences, the inferior manufacturer always lies in the disadvantaged status because of the terrible energy efficiency in production. Lack of cooperation fee, and disadvantages in technology and skills are main barriers limiting the inferior manufacturer's technological advancement. This study aims to investigate the inferior manufacturer's cooperation with a third party under the Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) mechanism through a game theory model. The results show that: (i) Cooperation with a third party under the EPC mechanism could help the inferior manufacturer achieve technological advancement and gain more profits without bearing extra cooperation fees. (ii) When the inferior manufacturer carries out cooperation with a third party under the EPC mechanism, four major factors are critical, including the revenue sharing ratio of the third party, the service level of the third party, the market size and the energy price. (iii) In EPC cooperation, the optimal service level provided by the third party depends on the revenue sharing ratio. (iv) When the inferior manufacturer carries out EPC cooperation with a third party, the cooperation would reduce the market equilibrium price, enhance the total equilibrium quantities and in the meanwhile increase the total consumer surplus. Overall, the study contributes to exploring the feasibility of introducing the EPC cooperation to fulfill the inferior manufacturer's technology advancement, in which the inferior manufacturer does not bear any extra fee for the cooperation. Particularly, the study contributes to investigating the manufacturer's optimal cooperation decisions by assessing the EPC cooperation between the inferior manufacturer and the third party based on game-theoretic models.

在存在技术差异的双头垄断市场中，由于生产中的能源效率极差，劣等制造商始终处于劣势地位。缺乏合作费用以及技术和技能上的劣势是限制劣等制造商技术进步的主要障碍。这项研究旨在调查在能源绩效合同下劣质制造商与第三方的合作（EPC）机制通过博弈论模型。结果表明：（i）在EPC机制下与第三方合作可以帮助劣等制造商实现技术进步并获得更多利润而无需承担额外的合作费用。（ii）在EPC机制下，劣等制造商与第三方进行合作时，至关重要的四个因素是：第三方的收益分成比例，第三方的服务水平，市场规模和能源价格。（iii）在EPC合作中，第三方提供的最佳服务水平取决于收益共享率。（iv）下级制造商与第三方进行EPC合作时，这种合作会降低市场均衡价格，增加总的均衡数量，同时增加总的消费者剩余。总体而言，该研究有助于探索引入EPC合作以实现劣等制造商的技术进步的可行性，其中劣等制造商不为此承担任何额外费用。特别是，该研究通过基于博弈论模型评估劣等制造商与第三方之间的EPC合作，有助于研究制造商的最佳合作决策。