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Two-period discount pricing strategies for an e-commerce platform with strategic consumers
Computers & Industrial Engineering ( IF 6.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2020.106640
Chunfa Li , Mingsen Chu , Chi Zhou , Lianxia Zhao

Abstract Flourishing online retail models have prompted platforms to design different discount pricing strategies of online coupons for strategic consumer behavior. To this end, we establish two-period models to study a platform’s discount pricing strategies with strategic consumers. The framework of this study includes three different online coupon redemption strategies: The first is an instant strategy, in which the platform recommends one short-term coupon in period 1, and consumers can only redeem the coupon in period 1; the second is a continuous strategy, in which the platform recommends one long-term coupon in period 1, but consumers can only redeem the coupon in period 2; and the third is a hybrid strategy, in which the platform recommends two coupons including one short-term coupon and one long-term coupon in period 1, and consumers can redeem one coupon in each period. The optimal discount pricing and online coupon strategy choices of the e-commerce platform are analyzed in light of this framework. The main findings are as follows. First, if the online coupon discount in period 1 is relatively large, the platform should give priority to the instant strategy while the continuous strategy is the suboptimal choice. When the degree of consumer patience and the fraction of strategic consumers are within a reasonable interval, the hybrid strategy and the continuous strategy can replace each other. Second, it is not always better to recommend two online coupons (one short-term and one long-term) simultaneously than to recommend one single online coupon (one short-term or one long-term) each time. Furthermore, we examine how the fraction of strategic consumers and the degree of consumer penitence interact with the platform’s strategy choice. Third, the existence of strategic consumers will force the platform to increase product prices for two periods.

中文翻译:

具有战略消费者的电子商务平台的两期折扣定价策略

摘要 蓬勃发展的在线零售模式促使平台针对战略性消费者行为设计不同的在线优惠券折扣定价策略。为此,我们建立了两期模型来研究平台与战略消费者的折扣定价策略。本研究的框架包括三种不同的在线优惠券兑换策略:第一种是即时策略,平台在第一期推荐一张短期优惠券,消费者只能在第一期兑换;第二种是持续策略,平台在第一期推荐一张长期优惠券,但消费者只能在第二期兑换该优惠券;三是混合策略,平台在第一期推荐两张券,一张短期券,一张长期券,消费者可以在每个时期兑换一张优惠券。在此框架下分析了电子商务平台的最优折扣定价和在线优惠券策略选择。主要发现如下。首先,如果第一期的线上优惠券折扣比较大,平台应该优先选择即时策略,而持续策略是次优选择。当消费者耐心程度和战略消费者比例在合理区间内时,混合战略和连续战略可以相互替代。其次,同时推荐两张在线优惠券(一张短期和一张长期)并不总是比每次推荐一张在线优惠券(一张短期或一张长期)更好。此外,我们研究了战略消费者的比例和消费者忏悔的程度如何与平台的战略选择相互作用。第三,战略消费者的存在将迫使平台在两个时期内提高产品价格。
更新日期:2020-09-01
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