The operation and maintenance sectors of electric multiple unit (EMU) are considered as game participants to optimize the preventive maintenance (PM) schedule of EMU components. The total cost of a component over a life cycle includes failure risk and maintenance cost. The failure risk of EMU components is assessed quantitatively by using an analytic hierarchy process and scoring and weighting the factors that affect the failure risk of such components. The operation sector expects failure risk to be minimized, whereas the maintenance sector expects maintenance costs to be low, and their interests interfere with each other to some extent. This study establishes a tristage bargaining dynamic game model of the operation sector priority bid and maintenance sector priority bid considering the PM reliability threshold R as the bargaining object. A numerical example demonstrates that the result is more beneficial to the sector that bids first, and the operation priority bid allows the component to maintain a higher reliability level over a life cycle, especially in the latter half of the component life cycle.

中文翻译：

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三阶段讨价还价基于动态博弈的电气多单元预防性维护

电动多单元（EMU）的运行和维护部门被视为游戏参与者，以优化EMU组件的预防性维护（PM）计划。组件在整个生命周期中的总成本包括故障风险和维护成本。通过使用层次分析法，对影响此类组件故障风险的因素进行评分和加权，可以定量评估EMU组件的故障风险。运营部门希望将故障风险降到最低，而维护部门则希望维护成本较低，并且他们的利益在某种程度上相互干扰。该研究建立了考虑PM可靠性阈值R的运营部门优先投标和维修部门优先投标的三阶段讨价还价动态博弈模型。作为讨价还价的对象。数值示例表明，该结果对首先竞标的部门更有利，并且操作优先级竞标允许组件在整个生命周期内（尤其是在组件生命周期的后半段）保持较高的可靠性。