In contrast to the econometric models that have been commonly used throughout a large portion of the literature, we develop six game-theoretic models to analyze governmental subsidy strategies in different market environments and to investigate the question of whether government subsidies crowd in or crowd out private investment in R&D activities. Based on realistic situations, we classify governmental subsidy strategies into three types, namely, no subsidy provided, subsidies provided based on the price of the end products, and subsidies provided based on the cost of R&D. In addition, according to whether competition exists in the market, we classify markets into monopoly markets and duopoly markets. Our research shows (a) that the relationship between government subsidies and private R&D investment is deeply impacted by the form of the subsidies used; (b) that the characteristic value of the R&D project and the competitive environment of the market are the two key factors that should be considered when governments decide which form of subsidy to employ; and (c) the optimal amount for each type of subsidy.

中文翻译：

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政府补贴对不同市场私人研发投入的影响

与大部分文献中普遍使用的计量经济学模型相反，我们开发了六个博弈论模型来分析不同市场环境中的政府补贴策略，并研究政府补贴是私人流入还是挤出的问题。在研发活动上的投资。根据实际情况，我们将政府补贴策略分为三类，即不提供补贴，基于最终产品价格提供的补贴和基于研发成本提供的补贴。此外，根据市场中是否存在竞争，我们将市场分为垄断市场和双头垄断市场。我们的研究表明（a）政府补贴与私人R＆R之间的关系 D投资受到所使用补贴形式的深刻影响；（b）研发项目的特征价值和市场竞争环境是政府决定采用哪种形式的补贴时应考虑的两个关键因素；（c）每种补贴的最佳金额。