In this paper, we study the timing decision of airlines’ investments in exclusive airport facilities in the presence of demand ambiguity and competition. We model the investment decision as a real options problem under ambiguity. An airline's ambiguity-averse preferences are modeled using the multiple prior expected utility form. We obtain the optimal investment timing rule for the airline and find that it requires the airline's expected present value of its future incremental profit from investing to exceed the investment cost by the option value multiplier. We then compare the airline's optimal investment timing rule to the social optimum and discuss two possible subsidy policies, a lump-sum subsidy and a per-unit subsidy, with which the government can align the airline's investment timing rule with the social optimum. We characterize the stepwise structure of both subsidy policies, in which the optimal time to invest in an exclusive terminal depends on three thresholds: the social optimum, the airline's break-even point, and a combination of the social optimum and the airline optimum. We conclude that the two subsidy policies have equivalent effects when the government and the airline have the same ambiguity levels, as they lead to the same investment timing and require the same amount of government funds.

在本文中，我们研究了在存在需求歧义和竞争的情况下，航空公司对专有机场设施进行投资的时间决策。在模棱两可的情况下，我们将投资决策建模为实物期权问题。航空公司的避免歧义偏好是使用多个先前的期望效用表建模的。我们获得了航空公司的最佳投资时机规则，发现它要求航空公司未来从投资中获得的增量利润的预期现值要超过期权价值乘数的投资成本。然后，我们将航空公司的最佳投资时机规则与社会最优方法进行比较，并讨论了两种可能的补贴政策，即一次性补贴和单位补贴，政府可以通过这些政策使航空公司的投资时机规则与社会最优方法保持一致。我们描述了这两种补贴政策的逐步结构，其中在专用终端上投资的最佳时间取决于三个阈值：社会最优，航空公司的收支平衡点以及社会最优和航空公司最优的组合。我们得出的结论是，当政府和航空公司的歧义程度相同时，这两种补贴政策会产生同等效果，因为它们导致相同的投资时机和所需的政府资金数量。