We study impatient customers’ joining strategies in a single-server Markovian queue with synchronized abandonment and multiple vacations. Customers receive the system information upon arrival, and decide whether to join or balk, based on a linear reward-cost structure under the acquired information. Waiting customers are served in a first-come-first-serve discipline, and no service is rendered during vacation. Server’s vacation becomes the cause of impatience for the waiting customers, which leads to synchronous abandonment at the end of vacation. That is, customers consider simultaneously but independent of others, whether to renege the system or to remain. We are interested to study the effect of both information and reneging choice on the balking strategies of impatient customers. We examine the customers’ equilibrium and socially optimal balking strategies under four cases of information: fully/almost observable and fully/almost unobservable cases, assuming the linear reward-cost structure. We compare the social benefits under all the information policies.

中文翻译：

---

具有假期和同步放弃的马尔可夫队列中的战略客户

我们研究了具有同步放弃和多个假期的单服务器马尔可夫队列中不耐烦的客户的加入策略。客户在到达时收到系统信息，并根据获取的信息下的线性奖励成本结构决定是加入还是拒绝。等候顾客的服务遵循先到先得的原则，假期期间不提供任何服务。服务员的假期成为等待客户不耐烦的原因，导致假期结束时同步放弃。也就是说，客户同时考虑但独立于其他人，是否违背系统或保留。我们有兴趣研究信息和违背选择对不耐烦客户的犹豫策略的影响。我们在四种信息情况下检查客户的均衡和社会最优阻碍策略：完全/几乎可观察和完全/几乎不可观察的情况，假设线性奖励成本结构。我们比较了所有信息政策下的社会效益。