As it is well acknowledged that the electoral system is one of the fundamental rocks of our modern society, the behavior of electors engaged in a voting system is of the utmost importance. In this context, the goal of the study is to model the behavior of voters in a first-past-the-post system and to analyze its consequences on a party system. Among the assumptions of this study is Duverger’s law, which states that first-past-the-post systems favor a two-party system as the voters engage in tactical voting, choosing to vote in favor of a less preferred candidate who has better odds of winning. In order to test this assumption and to better analyze the occurrence of the strategic behavior, a laboratory experiment was created. A total of 120 persons participated in the study. An asymmetrical payoff function was created to value the voters’ preference intensity. As a result, it was observed that as voters got used to the voting system, they engaged in more tactical voting behavior in order to either maximize the gain or minimize the loss of their choice. Moreover, the iterations where voters started displaying tactical behavior featured a clustering around two main choices. The obtained results are consistent with both the empirical results of real-life elections and Duverger’s law. A further discussion regarding the change in voters’ choice completes the analysis on the strategic behavior.

中文翻译：

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分析选民战略行为的实验室实验

众所周知，选举制度是现代社会的基石之一，参与投票制度的选民的行为至关重要。在这种情况下，本研究的目标是模拟选民在先得后选举制度中的行为，并分析其对政党制度的影响。在这项研究的假设中是Duverger的法律，这使得第一届过去的系统赞成一个双方制度，因为选民从事战术投票，选择投票赞成了一个更优选的候选人，他们有更好的候选人获胜。为了检验这一假设并更好地分析战略行为的发生，创建了一个实验室实验。共有 120 人参与了这项研究。创建了一个不对称的支付函数来评估选民的偏好强度。结果，据观察，随着选民习惯了投票系统，他们会采取更具战术性的投票行为，以最大化收益或最小化他们选择的损失。此外，选民开始展示战术行为的迭代以围绕两个主要选择的聚类为特征。所得结果与现实选举的实证结果和杜弗格定律均一致。关于选民选择变化的进一步讨论完成了对战略行为的分析。选民开始展示战术行为的迭代以围绕两个主要选择的聚类为特征。所得结果与现实选举的实证结果和杜弗格定律均一致。关于选民选择变化的进一步讨论完成了对战略行为的分析。选民开始展示战术行为的迭代以围绕两个主要选择的聚类为特征。所得结果与现实选举的实证结果和杜弗格定律均一致。关于选民选择变化的进一步讨论完成了对战略行为的分析。