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SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets From SGX Enclaves via Speculative Execution
IEEE Security & Privacy ( IF 2.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-01 , DOI: 10.1109/msec.2019.2963021
Guoxing Chen 1 , Sanchuan Chen 1 , Yuan Xiao 1 , Yinqian Zhang 1 , Zhiqiang Lin 1 , Ten-Hwang Lai 1
Affiliation  

The speculative execution of side-channel vulnerabilities in microarchitecture processors has raised concerns about the security of Intel's Software Guard eXtensions (SGX). We present SgxPectre attacks, the SGX variants of Spectre attacks, which exploit speculative execution vulnerabilities to subvert the confidentiality of SGX enclaves; evaluate Intel's existing countermeasures against SgxPectre attacks; and discuss security implications.

中文翻译:

SgxPectre:通过推测执行从 SGX Enclave 窃取英特尔的秘密

微架构处理器中侧信道漏洞的推测执行引发了对英特尔软件防护扩展 (SGX) 安全性的担忧。我们介绍了 SgxPectre 攻击,即 Spectre 攻击的 SGX 变体,它利用推测执行漏洞来破坏 SGX 飞地的机密性;评估英特尔针对 SgxPectre 攻击的现有对策;并讨论安全影响。
更新日期:2020-05-01
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