We consider fair division problems where indivisible items arrive one-by-one in an online fashion and are allocated immediately to agents who have additive utilities over these items. Many existing offline mechanisms do not work in this online setting. In addition, many existing axiomatic results often do not transfer from the offline to the online setting. For this reason, we propose here three new online mechanisms, as well as consider the axiomatic properties of three previously proposed online mechanisms. In this paper, we use these mechanisms and characterize classes of online mechanisms that are strategy-proof, and return envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations, as well as combinations of these properties. Finally, we identify an important impossibility result.

中文翻译：

---

具有附加效用的在线公平划分中的策略证明、无嫉妒和帕累托效率

我们考虑公平划分问题，其中不可分割的项目以在线方式一个接一个地到达，并立即分配给对这些项目具有附加效用的代理。许多现有的离线机制在此在线设置中不起作用。此外，许多现有的公理结果通常不会从离线设置转移到在线设置。出于这个原因，我们在这里提出了三种新的在线机制，并考虑了先前提出的三种在线机制的公理性质。在本文中，我们使用这些机制并描述了策略证明的在线机制类别，并返回无嫉妒和帕累托有效分配，以及这些属性的组合。最后，我们确定了一个重要的不可能结果。