Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that purports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Contrary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles that follow continuous trajectories through space.

中文翻译：

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超人文主义有什么问题？

埃斯菲尔德提出了一种极简主义的自然本体论，称为“超级休谟主义”，旨在适应量子现象并避免对新休谟形而上学的标准反对。我认为埃斯菲尔德的稀疏本体论具有违反直觉的后果，并在时间和空间的本质上产生了两个自我破坏的困境。与埃斯菲尔德相反，我否认超人文主义支持在空间中遵循连续轨迹的微观粒子本体论。