Coase shows how costly resources are (re)allocated via costly institutions, and that transaction costs must therefore be positive. However, Coase did not elaborate on transitions between institutions which incur positive transaction costs that are characterized by numerous institutional complementarities; that is, feedback loops that inform the need for, and pathways toward, institutional change. Economic investigations of complementary modes of (re)allocation are rarely undertaken, let alone studies of transitions between modes. However, modes of (re)allocation that achieve similar results at less cost are generally viewed as having production-raising value. This paper measures the costs of transitioning drought management institutions in Italy toward informal, participatory, and consensus-based approaches during several recent drought events. The chosen model is Drought Steering Committees, which offer a substitute for current formal (less flexible) planning approaches, and where lower transaction costs that are associated with the transition are inferred. Our results highlight the relevance of empirical assessments of ‘costly’ transitions based on a historical study of transaction costs, as well as supporting previous works that highlight the value of contextual analysis in economic studies, in order to identify the benefits of institutional investment.

中文翻译：

---

衡量意大利向非正式干旱管理机构的历史转变的交易成本

科斯展示了如何通过昂贵的制度（重新）分配昂贵的资源，因此交易成本必须是正的。然而，科斯没有详细说明机构之间的过渡，这些过渡会产生以众多制度互补为特征的正交易成本；也就是说，反馈循环告知制度变革的必要性和途径。很少对（重新）分配的互补模式进行经济调查，更不用说对模式之间的转换进行研究了。然而，以较低成本获得类似结果的（重新）分配模式通常被视为具有提高生产的价值。本文衡量了意大利在最近几次干旱事件中将干旱管理机构转变为非正式、参与性和基于共识的方法的成本。选择的模式是干旱指导委员会，它提供了当前正式（不太灵活）规划方法的替代品，并且推断与过渡相关的交易成本较低。我们的结果强调了基于交易成本历史研究的“代价高昂”转型实证评估的相关性，并支持先前强调经济研究中背景分析价值的工作，以确定机构投资的收益。