We study a cost sharing problem derived from bug bounty programs, where agents gain utility by the amount of time they get to enjoy the cost shared information. Once the information is provided to an agent, it cannot be retracted. The goal, instead of maximizing revenue, is to pick a time as early as possible, so that enough agents are willing to cost share the information and enjoy it for a premium time period, while other agents wait and enjoy the information for free after a certain amount of release delay. We design a series of mechanisms with the goal of minimizing the maximum delay and the total delay. Under prior-free settings, our final mechanism achieves a competitive ratio of $4$ in terms of maximum delay, against an undominated mechanism. Finally, we assume some distributions of the agents' valuations, and investigate our mechanism's performance in terms of expected delays.

中文翻译：

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具有最小发布延迟的成本分摊安全信息

我们研究了一个源自漏洞赏金计划的成本分摊问题，其中代理通过他们享受成本共享信息的时间来获得效用。一旦信息被提供给代理，就不能撤回。目标不是最大化收入，而是尽可能早地选择时间，以便有足够多的代理商愿意花费成本共享信息并在优质时间段内享受它，而其他代理商则等待并免费享受信息一定的发布延迟。我们设计了一系列机制，目标是最小化最大延迟和总延迟。在无优先设置下，我们的最终机制在最大延迟方面实现了 4 美元的竞争比率，与不受支配的机制相比。最后，我们假设代理估值的一些分布，