Abstract This paper studies the “Capital-constrained Newsvendor (CCNV)” problem in a Supply Chain Finance (SCF) system where the manufacturer offers a buyback (BB) contract to compensate the lender in the case of the retailer’s default. Firstly, a three-level Stackelberg game in the SCF system is characterized with the bank acting as a leader, the manufacturer as a sub-leader and the retailer as a follower. Then, the equilibriums of the SCF game are investigated under a monopolistic bank market and a competitive bank market respectively. On that basis, the coordination strategies of the SCF system are analyzed. It is found that a buyback contract combined with a wholesale price contract fully coordinates the overall SCF system, and all the SCF members benefit from the coordination as long as the buyback price coefficient falls within a favorable range known as the “Pareto Zone”. Additionally, a conditional buyback (CBB) contract is studied in the SCF system, and the partial credit guarantee (PCG) contract of Yan, Sun, Zhang, and Liu (2016) is further compared with our BB/CBB contract, confirming the substitutability of these two contracts in an SCF system.

中文翻译：

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用回购合同协调供应链金融系统：一个资金受限的报贩问题

摘要 本文研究了供应链金融（SCF）系统中的“资本约束报销商（CCNV）”问题，在该系统中，制造商提供回购（BB）合同以在零售商违约的情况下补偿贷方。首先，SCF系统中的三级Stackelberg博弈具有银行为领导者、制造商为次领导者、零售商为跟随者的特征。然后，分别在垄断银行市场和竞争银行市场下研究了供应链金融博弈的均衡。在此基础上，分析了供应链金融系统的协调策略。发现回购合同与批发价合同相结合，充分协调了整个SCF体系，只要回购价格系数落在“帕累托区”的有利范围内，所有SCF成员都将从协调中受益。此外，在 SCF 系统中研究了有条件回购 (CBB) 合约，并将 Yan、Sun、Zhang 和 Liu (2016) 的部分信用担保 (PCG) 合约与我们的 BB/CBB 合约进行了进一步比较，确认了可替代性SCF 系统中的这两个合同。