Abstract Half a century after the first piloted lunar landing, it is time to consider the program, lessons, and legacy of the lander that made it possible. This article does so from the perspective of Joseph Gavin, Jr., who led Apollo's Lunar Module (LM) Program from its unofficial origins as a controversial dream at Grumman in 1960, to its official inception by NASA in 1962, to its successful conclusion in 1972. He directed as many as 7500 employees in developing the LM and ultimately building twelve operational vehicles. All met mission requirements, and those that actually made a lunar landing worked every time. Developing the state-of-the-art machine required unprecedented innovations and maximization of reliability amid inherently unknown and untestable conditions. When congratulated on the success of each landing, Gavin typically replied that he would not be satisfied until his spacecraft and its crew got off the moon and arrived home safely. This process required three procedures in unison (firing of explosive bolts, severing by guillotine of wires and other connections between the descent and ascent stages, and firing of the ascent engine). Each function could be tested on Earth individually, but not under lunar conditions at systems level. Gavin drew lessons from his Grumman Corporation team and its subcontractors' experience that the author distills into eight principles: (1) Above all, return astronauts safely to Earth; accordingly: (2) create conditions for success, (3) attain reliability, (4) prioritize innovation over schedule over cost, (5) don't complicate things unnecessarily; (6) remove hierarchical barriers; (7) empower individuals, and (8) share information. Serving in top management subsequently returned Gavin to the naval aircraft development that remained Grumman's specialty. He applied the best practices learned from LM development, particularly improving initial construction to reduce the need for tests (per principle three). Drawing on extensive interviews with Gavin and thorough examination of his personal materials, this article explores his lessons and explains how he envisioned and applied them in practice as an aerospace project engineer leading one of history's greatest engineering achievements.

中文翻译：

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登月舱计划的教训：总监的结论

摘要 在首次载人登月之后的半个世纪，是时候考虑使着陆器成为可能的计划、教训和遗产了。这篇文章是从小约瑟夫·加文 (Joseph Gavin, Jr.) 的角度进行的，他领导阿波罗登月舱 (LM) 计划从 1960 年作为格鲁曼公司有争议的梦想的非官方起源，到 1962 年由 NASA 正式启动，到在1972. 他指导多达 7500 名员工开发 LM 并最终建造了 12 辆作战车辆。一切都满足了任务要求，那些真正登月的人每次都能成功。开发最先进的机器需要在固有的未知和无法测试的条件下进行前所未有的创新和可靠性的最大化。当祝贺每次着陆成功时，加文通常会回答说，直到他的航天器及其机组人员离开月球并安全回家，他才会满意。这个过程需要三个程序同时进行（爆炸螺栓的发射，用断头台切断下降和上升阶段之间的电线和其他连接，以及启动上升引擎）。每个功能都可以在地球上单独测试，但不能在系统级别的月球条件下进行测试。Gavin 从他的格鲁曼公司团队及其分包商的经验中汲取了教训，作者将其提炼为八项原则： (1) 最重要的是，让宇航员安全返回地球；相应地：(2) 为成功创造条件，(3) 获得可靠性，(4) 创新优先于进度而不是成本，(5) 不要使事情不必要地复杂化；(6) 消除等级障碍；(7) 赋予个人权力，(8) 共享信息。在担任高层管理人员之后，Gavin 回到了海军飞机开发领域，这仍然是格鲁曼公司的专长。他应用了从 LM 开发中学到的最佳实践，特别是改进了初始构造以减少测试需求（根据原则三）。本文通过对 Gavin 的广泛采访和对他个人材料的彻底检查，探讨了他的经验教训，并解释了他作为一名领导历史上最伟大工程成就之一的航空航天项目工程师如何设想和应用这些经验教训。特别是改进初始结构以减少测试的需要（根据原则三）。本文通过对 Gavin 的广泛采访和对他个人材料的彻底检查，探讨了他的经验教训，并解释了他作为一名领导历史上最伟大工程成就之一的航空航天项目工程师如何设想和应用这些经验教训。特别是改进初始结构以减少测试的需要（根据原则三）。本文通过对 Gavin 的广泛采访和对他个人材料的彻底检查，探讨了他的经验教训，并解释了他作为一名领导历史上最伟大工程成就之一的航空航天项目工程师如何设想和应用这些经验教训。