Abstract This paper analyses the performance of a multi-attribute auction for securing agri-environmental outcomes and cost-effective agri-environmental payments (AEPs). We set up a discriminatory price auction model in which farmers make an offer based on two attributes (i.e. the AEP and a proxy of environmental outcome). We provide a numerical simulation for a hypothetical agri-environmental scheme (AES) in Italy using FADN data 2011 for the Emilia-Romagna region (E-R). In three implementation scenarios, we compare the Budgetary cost-effectiveness (BCE), the Economic cost-effectiveness (ECE) and Information rent (IR) of the auction with that of two alternative policy instruments (i.e. uniform payment and marginal flat rate payment). Due to the heterogeneity in bidders' opportunity costs, the auction is more cost-effective than a uniform payment in delivering the target outcome. The performance indicators are sensitive to the farmers' expectations about the bid caps, revealing the opportunity of using both competition effect and information leverage associated with the implementation mechanism to increase the auction outcome when the budget is limited.

中文翻译：

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评估多属性拍卖对实现农业环境目标和高效支付设计的潜在贡献

摘要 本文分析了多属性拍卖的性能，以确保农业环境成果和具有成本效益的农业环境支付 (AEP)。我们建立了一个歧视性价格拍卖模型，其中农民基于两个属性（即 AEP 和环境结果的代理）提出报价。我们使用 2011 年艾米利亚-罗马涅地区 (ER) 的 FADN 数据为意大利的假设农业环境计划 (AES) 提供数值模拟。在三个实施场景中，我们将拍卖的预算成本效益 (BCE)、经济成本效益 (ECE) 和信息租金 (IR) 与两种替代政策工具（即统一支付和边际统一费率支付）进行比较. 由于投标人机会成本的异质性，在实现目标结果方面，拍卖比统一付款更具成本效益。绩效指标对农户对投标上限的期望很敏感，揭示了在预算有限的情况下，利用与实施机制相关的竞争效应和信息杠杆来提高拍卖结果的机会。