Moores Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikkas interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moores Paradox.

中文翻译：

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摩尔悖论与信念逻辑

摩尔斯悖论是任何形式信念理论的测试案例。在知识与信念中，Hintikka 为表达包含知识和信念认知概念的句子的陈述开发了一种多模态逻辑。他的描述旨在解释这个悖论。在本文中，我认为 Hintikka 对其中一个 doxastic 运算符的解释在哲学上是有问题的，并导致了一个不必要的强大逻辑系统。我提供了一个较弱的替代方案，它以更准确的方式捕捉我们对信念概念的逻辑直觉，同时又不牺牲为有问题的案例（例如摩尔斯悖论）提供解释的可能性。