This paper proposes a hybrid Energy Management Systems (EMS) architecture based on canonical coalition games for cooperative power exchange management of networked microgrids, interconnected with the main grid through a macro station. A central EMS and local EMSs perform three main processes: scheduling process, monitoring and rescheduling process, and benefits distribution process. A value function verifying the superadditivity property, which guarantees the grand coalition is the best coalition structure, and a computationally efficient non-linear scheduling model, which allows obtaining the power exchange strategy that minimizes transmission and transformation power losses, are defined. The scheduling process uses the scheduling model to generate a cooperative schedule for a rolling horizon. In order to enhance the performance of networked microgrids, the monitoring process uses efficiency thresholds for monitoring the schedule execution to identify schedule disruptions. For preserving the private information of microgrids, each local EMS only informs the central EMS of their state profiles, which specifies its power surplus or deficit for each time period of the scheduling horizon. The benefit-distribution process uses a Core-based model for distributing saved power loss obtained as a result of the power exchanged during the schedule execution. By comparing the proposed approach with a coalition formation game-based algorithm recently reported in the literature, it is concluded that the problem of power exchange management of networked microgrids should be modeled as a canonical coalition game and not as a coalition formation game. Results obtained from a prototype testing of the proposed EMS are presented.

本文提出了一种基于规范联盟博弈的混合能源管理系统（EMS）架构，用于通过微站与主电网互连的联网微电网的协同电力交换管理。中央EMS和本地EMS执行三个主要过程：调度过程，监视和重新调度过程以及收益分配过程。定义了一个值函数，该函数验证超可加性，从而确保大联盟是最佳联盟结构，并定义了一种计算效率高的非线性调度模型，该模型允许获得最小化传输和变换功率损耗的功率交换策略。调度过程使用调度模型来生成滚动时间表的协作调度。为了增强联网微电网的性能，监视过程使用效率阈值来监视调度执行以识别调度中断。为了保留微电网的私人信息，每个本地EMS仅将其状态信息通知中央EMS，状态信息指定了调度范围的每个时间段的电量过剩或不足。利益分配过程使用基于核的模型来分配节省的功率损耗，该功率损耗是由于在计划执行过程中交换功率而获得的。通过将所提出的方法与文献中最近报道的基于联盟形成博弈的算法进行比较，可以得出结论，应该将网络微电网的电力交换管理问题建模为规范联盟博弈而不是联盟形成博弈。介绍了从拟议EMS的原型测试中获得的结果。结论是，应该将网络化微电网的电力交换管理问题建模为规范联盟博弈而不是联盟形成博弈。介绍了从拟议EMS的原型测试中获得的结果。结论是，应该将网络化微电网的电力交换管理问题建模为规范联盟博弈而不是联盟形成博弈。介绍了从拟议EMS的原型测试中获得的结果。