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Evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders' decision-making behaviours in construction and demolition waste management
Environmental Impact Assessment Review ( IF 9.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.eiar.2020.106408
Lei Du , Yingbin Feng , Wei Lu , Lingkai Kong , Zhi Yang

Abstract Continuing industrial development has created large quantities of construction and demolition (C&D) waste, which has led to severe environmental and social problems. The aim of this study was to investigate the decision-making behaviours of stakeholders involved in C&D waste management. Based on evolutionary game theory, stakeholder decision-making behaviours in C&D waste management were analysed, and their influencing factors were identified, including government supervision costs, public participation costs, government penalties, government incentives, government supervisory intensity, probability of contractors conducting illegal dumping, probability of public participation, and probability of illegal dumping being detected. The results also revealed how government penalties and incentives impacted the decision-making behaviours of the contractors and public. Penalties and incentives can effectively reduce illegal C&D waste dumping behaviours, while excessive penalties and incentives have limitations in controlling illegal dumping. The model proposed in this research provides an experimental simulation platform to determine the appropriate values for government penalties and incentives for C&D waste management based on stakeholder decision-making behaviours. In addition, the research results for the stable strategy point of a three-party evolutionary game model demonstrated the importance of public participation in C&D waste management. These results may inform research hypotheses for future empirical studies and provide a simple model for developing appropriate government penalties and incentives in practice.

中文翻译:

建拆垃圾管理中利益相关者决策行为的演化博弈分析

摘要 持续的工业发展产生了大量的建筑和拆除(C&D)废物,导致了严重的环境和社会问题。本研究的目的是调查参与 C&D 废物管理的利益相关者的决策行为。基于演化博弈论,分析了建筑垃圾管理中利益相关者的决策行为,识别了其影响因素,包括政府监管成本、公众参与成本、政府处罚、政府激励、政府监管强度、承包商非法倾倒倾倒概率。 、公众参与概率和非法倾倒被发现的概率。结果还揭示了政府的处罚和激励措施如何影响承包商和公众的决策行为。处罚和奖励措施可以有效减少非法倾倒垃圾的行为,而过度的处罚和奖励措施在控制非法倾倒垃圾方面存在局限性。本研究中提出的模型提供了一个实验模拟平台,可以根据利益相关者的决策行为来确定政府对拆建废物管理的惩罚和激励措施的适当值。此外,三方演化博弈模型的稳定策略点的研究结果证明了公众参与在C&D废物管理中的重要性。
更新日期:2020-09-01
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