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Optimal price and service decisions for sharing platform and coordination between manufacturer and platform with recycling
Computers & Industrial Engineering ( IF 6.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-01 , DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2020.106586
Xuejie Ren , Michael Herty , Lindu Zhao

Abstract In this paper, a supply chain with a manufacturer and an Internet sharing platform who leases products to customers is considered. We solve the optimization problem in two structures, namely, without and with recycling. In basic structure, manufacturer produces new products and sells them to the platform. Then platform leases products to customers with per-use price and service level. Since platform keeps the ownership of products, reverse logistics from platform to manufacturer is explored. In both cases, cooperative and noncooperative relationships between manufacturer and platform are discussed. The results show cooperation is better than non-cooperation in profit and service aspects. Total profit in non-cooperative case accounts for 3/4 of the total profit in cooperative case, among which manufacturer’s profit is 1/2 and platform’s profit is 1/4. We also investigate the coordination policy between manufacturer and platform in noncooperative case via the recycling subsidy and find that subsidy affects the wholesale price merely. An example is given to illustrate values and sensitivity analyses are performed theoretically and numerically.

中文翻译:

制造商与回收平台之间共享平台和协调的最优价格和服务决策

摘要 本文考虑了一个由制造商和互联网共享平台向客户出租产品的供应链。我们以两种结构解决优化问题,即无循环和有循环。在基本结构中,制造商生产新产品并将其销售给平台。然后平台以每次使用的价格和服务水平向客户租赁产品。由于平台保留了产品的所有权,因此探索了从平台到制造商的逆向物流。在这两种情况下,都讨论了制造商和平台之间的合作和非合作关系。结果表明,合作在利润和服务方面优于不合作。非合作案例总利润占合作案例总利润的3/4,其中厂商利润为1/2,平台利润为1/4。我们还通过回收补贴调查了制造商与平台在非合作情况下的协调政策,发现补贴仅影响批发价格。给出了一个例子来说明值,并从理论上和数值上进行敏感性分析。
更新日期:2020-09-01
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