To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing (PP) must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.

中文翻译：

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预测编码的挑战：代表性或经验多样性？

为了成为大脑功能的统一理论，预测处理 (PP) 必须适应其丰富的表征多样性。吉利德等人。声称这种多样性需要多过程理论，因此对于假设通用规范计算的 PP 来说是遥不可及的。我们反对这一论点，而是提出 PP 未能解释表示的经验水平。