Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

中文翻译：

---

绿色供应链中的动态博弈模型研究：零售商销售努力水平下的政府补贴策略

基于动态博弈理论和委托代理理论，研究了绿色供应链管理中不同的政府补贴策略。假设零售商的销售努力水平涉及不对称信息，则本研究分析了不同的政府补贴策略对批发价格，产品绿色程度，零售价格，销售努力水平，制造商的利润和零售商的利润的影响。结果表明：（1）政府的补贴策略不仅可以有效地提高产品的绿色程度，而且可以增加绿色供应链中企业的利润，从而有助于零售商增加销售力度。（2）不管零售商的销售努力程度是高还是低，随着政府的补贴系数的增加，