The game-theoretic problem of choosing optimal strategies for oligopoly market agents with linear demand functions and nonlinear cost functions is considered. The conjectural variations of each agent, i.e., the expected responses (changes in actions) of his counteragents that optimize their utility functions, are studied. Formulas for calculating the conjectural variations of each agent and also the sum of the conjectural variations of all agents in the environment of each agent are derived. The signs of conjectural variations under an arbitrary level of Stackelberg leadership are analyzed. The following properties of conjectural variations are established: 1) the variations are negative if the cost functions of all environmental agents are either convex or concave; 2) the variations are positive if the agents with concave cost functions (the ones with the positive scale effect) prevail in the environment over the agents with convex cost functions (the ones with the negative scale effect). The sum of the agent’s conjectural variations is: 1) negative and its magnitude is bounded above by 1 if the environmental agents mainly have convex cost functions; 2) positive and unlimited if the agents with concave cost functions prevail in the environment.

考虑了为具有线性需求函数和非线性成本函数的寡头市场代理商选择最优策略的博弈论问题。研究了每个代理人的推测性变化，即优化其效用函数的他的代理人的预期响应（行为的变化）。推导了用于计算每个代理的猜想变化的公式以及每个代理环境中所有代理的猜想变化的总和。分析了在斯塔克尔贝格领导层任意水平下猜想变化的迹象。建立了猜想变量的以下特性：1）如果所有环境因素的成本函数都是凸的或凹的，则这些变量为负。2）如果环境中具有凹成本函数的代理（具有正规模效应的代理）胜于具有凸成本函数的代理（具有负规模效应的代理），则变化为正。行为主体的猜想变化之和为：1）如果环境行为主体主要具有凸成本函数，则其负数为1，其大小在1以上。2）如果在环境中占主导地位的成本函数较低的代理商占主导地位，则肯定且无限。